Formalizing first-order logic

Joris Roos

University of Wisconsin-Madison Sommerakademie Leysin 2018

August 15, 2018









æ

3

• • • • • • • • • • •

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D)$$

Image: A matrix and a matrix

э

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D)$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D))$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

First-order logic (FOL) extends this in two different ways:

• quantifiers: \forall, \exists

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D))$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

- quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- more complicated atomic formulas, consisting of:

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D))$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

- quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- more complicated atomic formulas, consisting of:
 - variables: x, y, z, \cdots

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D))$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

- quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- more complicated atomic formulas, consisting of:
 - variables: x, y, z, \cdots
 - functions: f(x), g(x, y), ...

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D))$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

- quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- more complicated atomic formulas, consisting of:
 - variables: x, y, z, \cdots
 - functions: f(x), g(x, y), ...
 - predicates: $P(x), x = y, \cdots,$

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D)$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

First-order logic (FOL) extends this in two different ways:

- quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- more complicated atomic formulas, consisting of:
 - variables: x, y, z, \cdots
 - functions: f(x), g(x, y), ...
 - predicates: $P(x), x = y, \cdots,$

First-order logic is powerful enough to formalize "all of mathematics".

Last time we considered propositional formulas:

$$((A \lor D) \to (D \lor \neg B)) \land \neg (A \leftarrow (B \lor C \land D)$$

They consist of constants (\top, \bot) , literals (A, B, ...), logical connectives and punctuation.

First-order logic (FOL) extends this in two different ways:

- quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- more complicated atomic formulas, consisting of:
 - variables: x, y, z, \cdots
 - functions: f(x), g(x, y), ...
 - predicates: $P(x), x = y, \cdots,$

First-order logic is powerful enough to formalize "all of mathematics". **Example.** Continuity

$$\forall x. \forall \varepsilon. \varepsilon > 0 \rightarrow (\exists \delta. \delta > 0 \rightarrow (\forall y. |x - y| < \delta \rightarrow |f(x) - f(y)| < \varepsilon))$$









< E

• • • • • • • • • • •

э

A FOL formula is a string of symbols from a certain alphabet.

A FOL formula is a string of symbols from a certain alphabet. **The alphabet consists of**

• Propositional constants: \top (true), \perp (false)

- Propositional constants: \top (true), \perp (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor

- Propositional constants: \top (true), \perp (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,

- Propositional constants: \top (true), \perp (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists

- Propositional constants: \top (true), \perp (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- Function symbols: f, g, ...

- Propositional constants: op (true), op (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- Function symbols: f, g, ...
- Predicate symbols: P, Q, R, ...

- Propositional constants: op (true), op (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- Function symbols: f, g, ...
- Predicate symbols: P, Q, R, ...
- Variable symbols: x, y, z, ...

A FOL formula is a string of symbols from a certain alphabet. The alphabet consists of

- Propositional constants: op (true), op (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- Function symbols: f, g, ...
- Predicate symbols: P, Q, R, ...
- Variable symbols: x, y, z, ...

We will define FOL formulas in three steps:

terms \longrightarrow atomic formulas \longrightarrow formulas

A FOL formula is a string of symbols from a certain alphabet. The alphabet consists of

- Propositional constants: op (true), op (false)
- Logical operators: \neg, \land, \lor
- Punctuation: brackets () and ,
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists
- Function symbols: f, g, ...
- Predicate symbols: P, Q, R, ...
- Variable symbols: x, y, z, ...

We will define FOL formulas in three steps:

 $\mathsf{terms} \longrightarrow \mathsf{atomic} \; \mathsf{formulas} \longrightarrow \mathsf{formulas}$

We often also want to fix the allowed function and predicate symbols (this is called a "language").

Definition (Language)

A first-order language (or signature) L is a pair (F, P) where

э

Definition (Language)

A first-order language (or signature) L is a pair (F, P) where

• *F* is a set of pairs (*f*, *n*) with *f* a function symbol and *n* a natural number.

Definition (Language)

A first-order language (or signature) L is a pair (F, P) where

- *F* is a set of pairs (*f*, *n*) with *f* a function symbol and *n* a natural number.
- P is a set of pairs (P, n) with P a predicate symbol and n a natural number.

Definition (Language)

A first-order language (or signature) L is a pair (F, P) where

- *F* is a set of pairs (*f*, *n*) with *f* a function symbol and *n* a natural number.
- P is a set of pairs (P, n) with P a predicate symbol and n a natural number.

The number n is called *arity* of the predicate or function symbol. A 0-ary function symbol is also called a constant symbol.

Definition (Language)

A first-order language (or signature) L is a pair (F, P) where

- *F* is a set of pairs (*f*, *n*) with *f* a function symbol and *n* a natural number.
- P is a set of pairs (P, n) with P a predicate symbol and n a natural number.

The number n is called *arity* of the predicate or function symbol. A 0-ary function symbol is also called a constant symbol.

Example. The language of arithmetic is

$$L_{\rm arith} = (\{(0,0),(1,0),(+,2),(*,2)\},\{(=,2)\})$$

Definition (Language)

A first-order language (or signature) L is a pair (F, P) where

- *F* is a set of pairs (*f*, *n*) with *f* a function symbol and *n* a natural number.
- P is a set of pairs (P, n) with P a predicate symbol and n a natural number.

The number n is called *arity* of the predicate or function symbol. A 0-ary function symbol is also called a constant symbol.

Example. The language of arithmetic is

$$L_{\rm arith} = (\{(0,0),(1,0),(+,2),(*,2)\},\{(=,2)\})$$

The language of set theory is

$$L_{\rm set} = (\{\}, \{(=,2), (\in,2)\})$$



The set of *terms* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is the smallest set (of admissible strings) such that



The set of *terms* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is the smallest set (of admissible strings) such that

• Every variable symbol is a term.

The set of *terms* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is the smallest set (of admissible strings) such that

Every variable symbol is a term.

2 If T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms and $(f, n) \in F$, then $f(T_1, \ldots, T_n)$ is a term.

The set of *terms* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is the smallest set (of admissible strings) such that

- Every variable symbol is a term.
- **2** If T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms and $(f, n) \in F$, then $f(T_1, \ldots, T_n)$ is a term.

(If n = 0 in (2), then the assumption is vacuous, so all constant symbols are terms.)

The set of *terms* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is the smallest set (of admissible strings) such that

Every variable symbol is a term.

2 If T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms and $(f, n) \in F$, then $f(T_1, \ldots, T_n)$ is a term.

(If n = 0 in (2), then the assumption is vacuous, so all constant symbols are terms.)

This is powerful enough to express all algebraic terms commonly used in mathematics.

The set of *terms* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is the smallest set (of admissible strings) such that

Every variable symbol is a term.

2 If T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms and $(f, n) \in F$, then $f(T_1, \ldots, T_n)$ is a term.

(If n = 0 in (2), then the assumption is vacuous, so all constant symbols are terms.)

This is powerful enough to express all algebraic terms commonly used in mathematics.

Example.

$$(x+y)(x-y)+y*y$$

is a term of L_{arith} (up to syntax sugar).

Definition (Atomic formula)

An *atomic formula* of a FOL language L = (F, P) is a string of the form

$$P(T_1,\ldots,T_n)$$

where T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms of L and $(P, n) \in P$.

Definition (Atomic formula)

An atomic formula of a FOL language L = (F, P) is a string of the form

$$P(T_1,\ldots,T_n)$$

where T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms of L and $(P, n) \in P$. The propositional constants \top, \bot are also atomic formulas.

(If n = 0 then $P(T_1, \ldots, T_n)$ is meant to be just the predicate symbol P.)

Definition (Atomic formula)

An atomic formula of a FOL language L = (F, P) is a string of the form

$$P(T_1,\ldots,T_n)$$

where T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms of L and $(P, n) \in P$. The propositional constants \top, \bot are also atomic formulas.

(If n = 0 then $P(T_1, ..., T_n)$ is meant to be just the predicate symbol P.) **Example.**

$$(x+y)(x-y)+y*y=0$$

is an atomic formula of L_{arith} (up to syntax sugar).

Definition (Atomic formula)

An atomic formula of a FOL language L = (F, P) is a string of the form

$$P(T_1,\ldots,T_n)$$

where T_1, \ldots, T_n are terms of L and $(P, n) \in P$. The propositional constants \top, \bot are also atomic formulas.

(If n = 0 then $P(T_1, ..., T_n)$ is meant to be just the predicate symbol P.) **Example.**

$$(x+y)(x-y)+y*y=0$$

is an atomic formula of L_{arith} (up to syntax sugar). **Example.**

$$x \in y$$

is an atomic formula of L_{set} .

The set of *formulas* of a FOL language L is the smallest set (of strings of admissible symbols) such that

Atomic formulas of L are formulas.

- Atomic formulas of L are formulas.
- 2 If F is a formula, then $\neg F$ is a formula.

- Atomic formulas of *L* are formulas.
- 2 If F is a formula, then $\neg F$ is a formula.
- **③** If *F*, *F'* are formulas, then \vee (*F*, *F'*) and \wedge (*F*, *F'*) are formulas.

- Atomic formulas of *L* are formulas.
- **2** If *F* is a formula, then $\neg F$ is a formula.
- **③** If *F*, *F*' are formulas, then \vee (*F*, *F*') and \wedge (*F*, *F*') are formulas.
- If x is a variable symbol and F is a formula, then ∀(x, F) and ∃(x, F) are formulas.

Example. This is a formula (of a suitable FOL language):

 $\exists (x, \forall (y, \land (Q(x), \neg P(x, y))))$

Example. This is a formula (of a suitable FOL language):

$$\exists (x, \forall (y, \land (Q(x), \neg P(x, y))))$$

For readability we prefer to write the formula as follows:

 $\exists x. \forall y. Q(x) \land \neg P(x, y)$

Example. This is a formula (of a suitable FOL language):

$$\exists (x, \forall (y, \land (Q(x), \neg P(x, y))))$$

For readability we prefer to write the formula as follows:

$$\exists x. \forall y. Q(x) \land \neg P(x, y)$$

This is just syntax sugar! We always keep in mind that the formula "actually" looks as above.









▶ ∢ ⊒

Image: A mathematical states of the state

æ

Definition (Interpretation)

An *interpretation* M of a FOL language L = (F, P) consists of:

Definition (Interpretation)

An *interpretation* M of a FOL language L = (F, P) consists of:

a nonempty set D called the domain,

Definition (Interpretation)

An *interpretation* M of a FOL language L = (F, P) consists of:

- a nonempty set D called the domain,
- ② for each *n*-ary function (f, n) ∈ F with n ≥ 1, a function $f_M : D^n → D$,

Definition (Interpretation)

An *interpretation* M of a FOL language L = (F, P) consists of:

- a nonempty set D called the domain,
- Gor each *n*-ary function (f, n) ∈ F with n ≥ 1, a function
 $f_M : D^n → D$,
- So for each *n*-ary predicate (*P*, *n*) ∈ P, a function $P_M : D^n \to {\text{true, false}}.$

Definition (Interpretation)

An *interpretation* M of a FOL language L = (F, P) consists of:

- a nonempty set D called the domain,
- Gor each *n*-ary function (f, n) ∈ F with n ≥ 1, a function
 $f_M : D^n → D$,
- Solution for each n-ary predicate (P, n) ∈ P, a function P_M : Dⁿ → {true, false}.

(In the case n = 0, f_M is simply a constant in D; similarly, P_M is a constant truth value.)

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

Image: Image:

An interpretation of L_{arith} is given by arithmetic of natural numbers: **1** $D := \mathbb{N}$

Image: Image:

An interpretation of $\textit{L}_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

• $D := \mathbb{N}$

3
$$0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$$

Image: Image:

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

•
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

2
$$0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$$

3 $=_M (x, y) :=$ true iff $x = y$

Image: Image:

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

•
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

• $0_M := 0, \ 1_M := 1, \ +_M(x, y) := x + y, \ *_M(x, y) := x * y$
• $=_M (x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

1
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$
2 $0_M := 0, \ 1_M := 1, \ +_M(x, y) := x + y, \ *_M(x, y) := x * y$
3 $=_M(x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by boolean arithmetic:

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

1
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$
2 $0_M := 0, \ 1_M := 1, \ +_M(x, y) := x + y, \ *_M(x, y) := x * y$
3 $=_M(x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

•
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

• $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$
• $=_M (x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by boolean arithmetic:

•
$$D := \{0, 1\}$$

• $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y \pmod{2}, *_M(x, y) := x \cdot y \pmod{2}$

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

•
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

• $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$
• $=_M (x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by boolean arithmetic:

D := {0,1}

$$D_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y \pmod{2}, \\
 *_M(x, y) := x \cdot y \pmod{2}$$
 S = M(x, y) := true iff x = y

We call this one $M_{\rm bool}$.

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

1
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

2 $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$
3 $=_M (x, y) :=$ true iff $x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by boolean arithmetic:

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

1
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

2 $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$
3 $=_M (x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by boolean arithmetic:

$$D := \mathbb{Z},$$

An interpretation of $L_{\rm arith}$ is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

1
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

2 $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$
3 $=_M (x, y) :=$ true iff $x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of ${\it L}_{\rm arith}$ is given by boolean arithmetic:

1
$$D := \mathbb{Z}$$
,
2 $0_M := 7$, $1_M := 0$, $+_M(x, y) := x - 3y^2$, $*_M(x, y) := x + y$,

An interpretation of L_{arith} is given by arithmetic of natural numbers:

1
$$D := \mathbb{N}$$

2 $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y, *_M(x, y) := x * y$
3 $=_M (x, y) :=$ true iff $x = y$

We call this one $M_{\mathbb{N}}$.

Another interpretation of L_{arith} is given by boolean arithmetic:

•
$$D := \{0, 1\}$$

• $0_M := 0, 1_M := 1, +_M(x, y) := x + y \pmod{2}, \\ *_M(x, y) := x \cdot y \pmod{2}$
• $=_M (x, y) := \text{true iff } x = y$
We call this one M_{back}

e call this one $M_{\rm bool}$.

•
$$D := \mathbb{Z}$$
,
• $0_M := 7, \ 1_M := 0, \ +_M(x, y) := x - 3y^2, \ *_M(x, y) := x + y$,
• $=_M (x, y) := \text{true iff } x \neq y$

A valuation v for an interpretation M is a map from the set of variable symbols to the domain D: $v(x) \in D$ for every variable symbol x.

A valuation v for an interpretation M is a map from the set of variable symbols to the domain D: $v(x) \in D$ for every variable symbol x.

Let *M* be an interpretation and *v* a valuation. Then to each term *t* we assign a value $ev_{M,v}(t) \in D$ such that

A valuation v for an interpretation M is a map from the set of variable symbols to the domain D: $v(x) \in D$ for every variable symbol x.

Let *M* be an interpretation and *v* a valuation. Then to each term *t* we assign a value $ev_{M,v}(t) \in D$ such that

• $ev_{M,v}(x) = v(x)$ if x is a variable symbol,

A valuation v for an interpretation M is a map from the set of variable symbols to the domain D: $v(x) \in D$ for every variable symbol x.

Let M be an interpretation and v a valuation. Then to each term t we assign a value $ev_{M,v}(t) \in D$ such that

•
$$ev_{M,v}(x) = v(x)$$
 if x is a variable symbol,

2

 $\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(f(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) = f_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(t_n))$

for every n-ary function symbol f.

A valuation v for an interpretation M is a map from the set of variable symbols to the domain D: $v(x) \in D$ for every variable symbol x.

Let M be an interpretation and v a valuation. Then to each term t we assign a value $ev_{M,v}(t) \in D$ such that

•
$$ev_{M,v}(x) = v(x)$$
 if x is a variable symbol,

2

$$\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(f(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) = f_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(t_n))$$

for every n-ary function symbol f.

By structural induction this defines a unique map from the set of terms to the domain D.

For each formula F, interpretation M and valuation v we want to define a meaning $ev_{M,v}(F) \in {\text{true, false}}.$

For each formula F, interpretation M and valuation v we want to define a meaning $ev_{M,v}(F) \in {true, false}$. The idea is again structural induction, but there is a catch! For each formula F, interpretation M and valuation v we want to define a meaning $ev_{M,v}(F) \in {\text{true, false}}.$

The idea is again structural induction, but there is a catch!

The semantics of the quantifiers require us to modify the assignment v for the variables bound by a quantifier.

For each formula F, interpretation M and valuation v we want to define a meaning $ev_{M,v}(F) \in {\text{true, false}}.$

The idea is again structural induction, but there is a catch!

The semantics of the quantifiers require us to modify the assignment v for the variables bound by a quantifier.

For every variable symbol x and every $a \in D$ we define

$$v[x \mapsto a]$$

to be the assignment that maps x to a and every $y \neq x$ to v(y).

For each formula F, interpretation M and valuation v we want to define a meaning $ev_{M,v}(F) \in {\text{true, false}}.$

The idea is again structural induction, but there is a catch!

The semantics of the quantifiers require us to modify the assignment v for the variables bound by a quantifier.

For every variable symbol x and every $a \in D$ we define

$$v[x \mapsto a]$$

to be the assignment that maps x to a and every $y \neq x$ to v(y).

Evaluation of formulas

Now we can run the structural induction:

• $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) := P_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.

Evaluation of formulas

- $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) := P_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.
- 2 $\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(\neg F)$ is true iff $\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(F)$ is false.

Evaluation of formulas

- $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) := P_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.
- 2 $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(\neg F)$ is true iff $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(F)$ is false.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \lor F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.

- $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) := P_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.
- 2 $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(\neg F)$ is true iff $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(F)$ is false.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \lor F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.
- $\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(F \wedge F')$ is true iff both, $\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(F)$ and $\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(F')$ are true.

- $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) := P_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.
- 2 $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(\neg F)$ is true iff $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(F)$ is false.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \vee F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \wedge F')$ is true iff both, $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$ and $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ are true.
- Sev_{M,v}(∃x.F) is true iff there exists a ∈ D such that ev_{M,v[x→a]}(F) is true.

- $ev_{M,v}(P(t_1,...,t_n)) := P_M(ev_{M,v}(t_1),...,ev_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.
- 2 $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(\neg F)$ is true iff $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(F)$ is false.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \vee F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \wedge F')$ is true iff both, $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$ and $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ are true.
- Sev_{M,v}(∃x.F) is true iff there exists a ∈ D such that ev_{M,v[x→a]}(F) is true.
- **⑤** $ev_{M,\nu}(\forall x.F)$ is true iff for all $a \in D$, $ev_{M,\nu[x\mapsto a]}(F)$ is true.

- $\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)) := P_M(\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_1),\ldots,\operatorname{ev}_{M,v}(t_n))$ for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \vee F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \wedge F')$ is true iff both, $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$ and $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ are true.
- Sev_{M,v}(∃x.F) is true iff there exists a ∈ D such that ev_{M,v[x→a]}(F) is true.
- **◎** $ev_{M,v}(\forall x.F)$ is true iff for all $a \in D$, $ev_{M,v[x\mapsto a]}(F)$ is true.

Beware: the domain D is nonempty, but otherwise arbitrary (e.g. could be uncountably infinite) and the functions f_M , P_M need not be computable.

•
$$ev_{M,v}(P(t_1,...,t_n)) := P_M(ev_{M,v}(t_1),...,ev_{M,v}(t_n))$$

for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.

- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \vee F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \wedge F')$ is true iff both, $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$ and $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ are true.
- Sev_{M,v}(∃x.F) is true iff there exists a ∈ D such that ev_{M,v[x→a]}(F) is true.
- **③** $ev_{M,v}(\forall x.F)$ is true iff for all $a \in D$, $ev_{M,v[x\mapsto a]}(F)$ is true.

Beware: the domain D is nonempty, but otherwise arbitrary (e.g. could be uncountably infinite) and the functions f_M , P_M need not be computable. To enable a straightforward computer implementation of the semantics we need to restrict to finite D.

•
$$ev_{M,v}(P(t_1,...,t_n)) := P_M(ev_{M,v}(t_1),...,ev_{M,v}(t_n))$$

for every *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*.

- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \vee F')$ is true iff at least one of $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$, $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ is true.
- $ev_{M,\nu}(F \wedge F')$ is true iff both, $ev_{M,\nu}(F)$ and $ev_{M,\nu}(F')$ are true.
- Sev_{M,v}(∃x.F) is true iff there exists a ∈ D such that ev_{M,v[x→a]}(F) is true.
- **③** $ev_{M,v}(\forall x.F)$ is true iff for all $a \in D$, $ev_{M,v[x\mapsto a]}(F)$ is true.

Beware: the domain D is nonempty, but otherwise arbitrary (e.g. could be uncountably infinite) and the functions f_M , P_M need not be computable. To enable a straightforward computer implementation of the semantics we need to restrict to finite D.

The set of *free variables* of a formula F is defined as the set of variable symbols that are not bound by quantifiers and denoted FV(F).

The set of *free variables* of a formula F is defined as the set of variable symbols that are not bound by quantifiers and denoted FV(F). A formula without free variables is called a *sentence*.

The set of *free variables* of a formula F is defined as the set of variable symbols that are not bound by quantifiers and denoted FV(F). A formula without free variables is called a *sentence*.

Our setup allows to prove properties of the semantics:

The set of *free variables* of a formula F is defined as the set of variable symbols that are not bound by quantifiers and denoted FV(F). A formula without free variables is called a *sentence*.

Our setup allows to prove properties of the semantics:

Lemma

Let F be a formula and M an interpretation. If v, v' are valuations such that v(x) = v'(x) for every $x \in FV(F)$, then

$$\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(F) = \operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu'}(F).$$

The set of *free variables* of a formula F is defined as the set of variable symbols that are not bound by quantifiers and denoted FV(F). A formula without free variables is called a *sentence*.

Our setup allows to prove properties of the semantics:

Lemma

Let F be a formula and M an interpretation. If v, v' are valuations such that v(x) = v'(x) for every $x \in FV(F)$, then

$$\operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu}(F) = \operatorname{ev}_{M,\nu'}(F).$$

As a corollary, if F is a sentence, then $ev_{M,v}(F)$ does not depend on the valuation v.

Let F be a formula. An interpretation M is called a model of F if $ev_{M,v}(F) = true$ for every valuation v (we also say that F holds).

э

Let F be a formula. An interpretation M is called a model of F if $ev_{M,v}(F) = true$ for every valuation v (we also say that F holds).

Definition

A formula F is called *satisfiable* if it has a model.

Let F be a formula. An interpretation M is called a model of F if $ev_{M,v}(F) = true$ for every valuation v (we also say that F holds).

Definition

A formula F is called *satisfiable* if it has a model.

Definition

A formula *F* is called *logically valid* or a *tautology* if every interpretation is a model.

Let F be a formula. An interpretation M is called a model of F if $ev_{M,v}(F) = true$ for every valuation v (we also say that F holds).

Definition

A formula F is called *satisfiable* if it has a model.

Definition

A formula *F* is called *logically valid* or a *tautology* if every interpretation is a model.









3

Image: A matrix and a matrix

æ

• Fix a language L, fix a formula F.

Image: A matched black

э

- Fix a language *L*, fix a formula *F*.
- We would like to describe a procedure that decides if *F* is satisfiable, in finitely many steps.

- Fix a language *L*, fix a formula *F*.
- We would like to describe a procedure that decides if *F* is satisfiable, in finitely many steps.
- Unfortunately, this is generally not possible (first-order logic is "undecidable" if *L* is non-trivial enough).

- Fix a language *L*, fix a formula *F*.
- We would like to describe a procedure that decides if *F* is satisfiable, in finitely many steps.
- Unfortunately, this is generally not possible (first-order logic is "undecidable" if *L* is non-trivial enough).
- However, it is "semi-decidable": if *F* is not satisfiable, then we can verify that in finite time.

- Fix a language *L*, fix a formula *F*.
- We would like to describe a procedure that decides if *F* is satisfiable, in finitely many steps.
- Unfortunately, this is generally not possible (first-order logic is "undecidable" if *L* is non-trivial enough).
- However, it is "semi-decidable": if *F* is not satisfiable, then we can verify that in finite time.

• The basic idea is to reduce the problem to solving propositional SAT.

The basic idea is to reduce the problem to solving propositional SAT.To do that we first "get rid" of quantifiers.

- The basic idea is to reduce the problem to solving propositional SAT.
- To do that we first "get rid" of quantifiers.
- Each transformation will preserve satisfiability, but not necessarily logic equivalence.

 $\forall x_1. \cdots \forall x_n. F$

 $\forall x_1. \cdots \forall x_n. F$

(This can be made precise by an inductive definition.) F and gen(F) are not logically equivalent, but *equisatisfiable*:

 $\forall x_1. \cdots \forall x_n. F$

(This can be made precise by an inductive definition.) F and gen(F) are not logically equivalent, but *equisatisfiable*: F is satisfiable if and only if gen(F) is satisfiable.

 $\forall x_1. \cdots \forall x_n. F$

(This can be made precise by an inductive definition.) F and gen(F) are not logically equivalent, but *equisatisfiable*: F is satisfiable if and only if gen(F) is satisfiable. Thus, from now on we assume that F is a sentence.

Example.

$$\forall x. \forall y. \exists z. (P(x) \land Q(y, z))$$

is in PNF.

Example.

$$\forall x. \forall y. \exists z. (P(x) \land Q(y, z))$$

is in PNF.

$$(\exists x.P(x)) \rightarrow \forall y.P(y)$$

is not in PNF.

Example.

$$\forall x. \forall y. \exists z. (P(x) \land Q(y, z))$$

is in PNF.

$$(\exists x.P(x)) \rightarrow \forall y.P(y)$$

is not in PNF. Every formula can be transformed into a logically equivalent formula in PNF.

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

 $\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

$\exists f: D \to D \text{ s.t. } \forall x \in D \text{ we have } P(x, f(x))$

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

$\exists f: D \rightarrow D \text{ s.t. } \forall x \in D \text{ we have } P(x, f(x))$

(In general, this is essentially the axiom of choice, but it suffices to consider countable D here, which does not require choice.)

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

$\exists f: D \to D \text{ s.t. } \forall x \in D \text{ we have } P(x, f(x))$

(In general, this is essentially the axiom of choice, but it suffices to consider countable D here, which does not require choice.) But we cannot transform formulas of the form

 $\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

$\exists f: D \to D \text{ s.t. } \forall x \in D \text{ we have } P(x, f(x))$

(In general, this is essentially the axiom of choice, but it suffices to consider countable D here, which does not require choice.) But we cannot transform formulas of the form

 $\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$

into

 $\exists f.\forall x.P(x,f(x)),$

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

$\exists f: D \to D \text{ s.t. } \forall x \in D \text{ we have } P(x, f(x))$

(In general, this is essentially the axiom of choice, but it suffices to consider countable D here, which does not require choice.) But we cannot transform formulas of the form

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

$$\exists f.\forall x.P(x,f(x)),$$

because the latter is not a first-order formula (because f is not a variable symbol).

Joris Roos

The main idea is that the following are equivalent:

$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D \text{ s.t. } P(x, y) \text{ holds}$

$\exists f: D \to D \text{ s.t. } \forall x \in D \text{ we have } P(x, f(x))$

(In general, this is essentially the axiom of choice, but it suffices to consider countable D here, which does not require choice.) But we cannot transform formulas of the form

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

$$\exists f.\forall x.P(x,f(x)),$$

because the latter is not a first-order formula (because f is not a variable symbol).

Joris Roos

Instead, we transform

 $\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$

Image: A matrix and a matrix

2

Instead, we transform

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

 $\forall x. P(x, f(x))$

-

2

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

 $\forall x. P(x, f(x))$

and augment the language L by a new function symbol f (called a *Skolem function*).

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

 $\forall x. P(x, f(x))$

and augment the language L by a new function symbol f (called a *Skolem function*).

If F is in prenex normal form, we can iterate this to produce a new equisatisfiable formula skolemize(F) that has no existential quantifiers.

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

 $\forall x. P(x, f(x))$

and augment the language L by a new function symbol f (called a *Skolem function*).

If F is in prenex normal form, we can iterate this to produce a new equisatisfiable formula skolemize(F) that has no existential quantifiers. **Example.**

skolemize($\exists x. \forall y. \exists z. \forall u. \exists v. P(x, y, z, u, v)$)

$$\forall x. \exists y. P(x, y)$$

into

$$\forall x. P(x, f(x))$$

and augment the language L by a new function symbol f (called a *Skolem function*).

If F is in prenex normal form, we can iterate this to produce a new equisatisfiable formula skolemize(F) that has no existential quantifiers. **Example.**

skolemize(
$$\exists x. \forall y. \exists z. \forall u. \exists v. P(x, y, z, u, v)$$
)

$$= \forall y. \forall u. P(c, y, f(y), u, g(y, u))$$

(c, f, g are new function symbols)

We are now left with a formula of the form

 $\forall x_1. \cdots \forall x_n. F'$

where F' contains no quantifiers.

We are now left with a formula of the form

$$\forall x_1. \cdots \forall x_n. F'$$

where F' contains no quantifiers.

By definition of satisfiability, we can simply remove the quantifiers: the quantifier-free formula

F'

is equisatisfiable to the previous, and thus equisatisfiable to the original formula F.

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

We are now left with deciding whether a quantifier-free formula is satisfiable.

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

We are now left with deciding whether a quantifier-free formula is satisfiable.

Theorem (Herbrand compactness theorem)

A quantifier-free formula F is satisfiable if and only if every finite set of ground instances is satisfiable.

Theorem (Herbrand compactness theorem)

A quantifier-free formula F is satisfiable if and only if every finite set of ground instances is satisfiable.

A *ground term* is one that only consists of function symbols (including constant symbols).

Theorem (Herbrand compactness theorem)

A quantifier-free formula F is satisfiable if and only if every finite set of ground instances is satisfiable.

A *ground term* is one that only consists of function symbols (including constant symbols).

A ground instance is the propositional formula that arises from replacing each of the free variables of F by a ground term and interpreting atomic formulas as propositional literals.

Theorem (Herbrand compactness theorem)

A quantifier-free formula F is satisfiable if and only if every finite set of ground instances is satisfiable.

A *ground term* is one that only consists of function symbols (including constant symbols).

A ground instance is the propositional formula that arises from replacing each of the free variables of F by a ground term and interpreting atomic formulas as propositional literals.

This is in principle an automatic theorem prover!

Theorem (Herbrand compactness theorem)

A quantifier-free formula F is satisfiable if and only if every finite set of ground instances is satisfiable.

A *ground term* is one that only consists of function symbols (including constant symbols).

A ground instance is the propositional formula that arises from replacing each of the free variables of F by a ground term and interpreting atomic formulas as propositional literals.

This is in principle an automatic theorem prover!

It is guaranteed to terminate in the case that the original formula is not satisfiable.

Say we want to prove that the *drinker's principle* holds:

 $\exists x. \forall y. (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$

(the language contains only the unary predicate P)

э

Say we want to prove that the *drinker's principle* holds:

 $\exists x. \forall y. (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$

(the language contains only the unary predicate P) Equivalently we can show that the negation is not satisfiable:

 $\neg(\exists x.\forall y.(P(x) \rightarrow P(y)))$

Say we want to prove that the *drinker's principle* holds:

 $\exists x. \forall y. (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$

(the language contains only the unary predicate P) Equivalently we can show that the negation is not satisfiable:

$$\neg(\exists x.\forall y.(P(x) \rightarrow P(y)))$$

Step 1: convert to PNF

$$\forall x. \exists y. \neg (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$$

Say we want to prove that the *drinker's principle* holds:

 $\exists x. \forall y. (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$

(the language contains only the unary predicate P) Equivalently we can show that the negation is not satisfiable:

$$\neg(\exists x.\forall y.(P(x) \to P(y)))$$

Step 1: convert to PNF

$$\forall x. \exists y. \neg (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$$

Step 2: Skolemize

$$\forall x. \neg (P(x) \to P(f(x)))$$

(the language no contains the unary predicate P and the unary function f)

Say we want to prove that the *drinker's principle* holds:

 $\exists x. \forall y. (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$

(the language contains only the unary predicate P) Equivalently we can show that the negation is not satisfiable:

$$\neg(\exists x.\forall y.(P(x) \to P(y)))$$

Step 1: convert to PNF

$$\forall x. \exists y. \neg (P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$$

Step 2: Skolemize

$$\forall x. \neg (P(x) \to P(f(x)))$$

(the language no contains the unary predicate P and the unary function f)

Step 3: Remove quantifiers

$$\neg(P(x) \rightarrow P(f(x)))$$

Joris Roos

First-order logic

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

3

Image: A image: A

Image: A matrix and a matrix

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

(for the set of ground terms to be non-empty we need to add a constant symbol c to the language, but this does not change satisfiability)

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

(for the set of ground terms to be non-empty we need to add a constant symbol c to the language, but this does not change satisfiability)

1. First ground term x = c:

 $P(c) \wedge \neg P(f(c))$

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

(for the set of ground terms to be non-empty we need to add a constant symbol c to the language, but this does not change satisfiability)

1. First ground term x = c:

$$P(c) \wedge \neg P(f(c))$$

This is a single propositional formula with literals P(c) and P(f(c))!

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

(for the set of ground terms to be non-empty we need to add a constant symbol c to the language, but this does not change satisfiability)

1. First ground term x = c:

$$P(c) \wedge \neg P(f(c))$$

This is a single propositional formula with literals P(c) and P(f(c))! This is still satisfiable.

Step 3': For convenience, let us bring the formula into DNF

 $P(x) \wedge \neg P(f(x))$

Step 4: Iterate through ground instances

(for the set of ground terms to be non-empty we need to add a constant symbol c to the language, but this does not change satisfiability)

1. First ground term x = c:

$$P(c) \land \neg P(f(c))$$

This is a single propositional formula with literals P(c) and P(f(c))! This is still satisfiable.

2. Add second ground term x = f(c):

$$P(c) \land \neg P(f(c)), P(f(c)) \land \neg P(f(f(c)))\}$$

These are not simultanously satisfiable! QED

< □ > < 同 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 >



Melvin Fitting. First-order Logic and Automated Theorem Proving. (Springer, 1996)

John Harrison. Handbook of Practical Logic and Automated Reasoning. (Cambridge, 2009)