



Invitation

Logic Colloquium

Beau Mount

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On the Second-Order Squeezing Argument

the talk will take place online
on **Monday, 17.05.2021** at **15:15**

All interested are welcome to attend

Abstract: In a famous essay, Georg Kreisel (1967) made two claims about the relationship between model-theoretic validity (truth in all set-sized structures) and intuitive validity (roughly, truth in all structures whatsoever): (1) in the first-order case, they can be shown to coincide by a 'squeezing argument'; (2) in the second-order case, they cannot. In a recent essay, Juliette Kennedy and Jouko Väänänen (2017) have questioned (2). They suggest that there is a squeezing argument for second-order logic, but it uses truth in all Henkin models rather than truth in all standard models in the key step. On their view, the familiar complaint that Henkin models do not capture the second-order quantifier is misguided here: the distinction between a standard and a Henkin model can only be made 'from outside', and its use is out of place when one is carrying on fundamental reasoning in one's home language. I argue against their position: I show that, given an extremely convincing principle about intuitive validity due to George Boolos (1985), the falsity of the thesis about Henkin models needed for their argument is simply a theorem in a framework that all parties to the debate should accept. No view 'from outside' is required: no greater degree of semantic reflection is needed to carry out the proof than to set up Kreisel's problem in the first place.

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Coordinators of the Logic Colloquium